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Abstract
This paper surveys the application of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis to recent
regulatory experience, especially in Europe. From a review of regulatory case studies,
particularly of network industries, it is clear that regulatory practice di¤ers from the-
oretical precedent in choice of methodology, sample size, model specication and price
or revenue control implementation. A principal-agent model of linear regulatory con-
tracts is used to understand this discrepancy, suggesting that e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis has been used to capture economic rent rather than to provide incentives for ef-
ciency. Predictions of the model are used to investigate other assumptions in e¢ ciency
and productivity analysis.
Keywords: regulation, data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis
JEL classication: D24, L25, L51
1. Introduction
This paper1 asks the question: in the application of e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis to regulated industries and government agencies, why do regulators not
behave more like the text-books say they should? More prosaically, it has two
purposes: to illustrate the issues that regulators have become aware of in applying
e¢ ciency and productivity analysis, and to determine if experience of regulatory
practice has lessons for theoretical and empirical developments in e¢ ciency and
productivity analysis.
It is useful to survey these issues using the experience of some of the data envel-
opment analysis and econometric studies carried out by European regulators and
Governments in the last two decades2 . A fundamental question is why govern-
ments and regulators are interested in e¢ ciency and productivity analysis. Three
di¤erent objectives are possible: the aim may be simply to be able to measure
e¢ ciency or productivity in regulated entities or government agencies in order to
be better informed; alternatively, the aim may be to reinforce the impact of in-
centives for greater e¢ ciency, or, nally, the aim may be to address the issue of
capturing economic rent. I shall argue that in the area of governance, i.e. manage-
ment of government agencies, the rst objective is most important. In the area of
regulation of investor-owned rms, it is natural to suppose that, aside from simple
measurement, the principal objective of regulatory use of e¢ ciency and productiv-
ity analysis is to reinforce incentives. However, I shall argue that this is mistaken,
and that the principal role is to determine the e¢ cient transfer of economic rent
from regulated producers to consumers, and society as a whole. This will be ap-
parent from the nature of regulatory games. Surprisingly, this objective gives a
Department of Economics, Loughborough University, UK, email address: t.g.weyman-
jones@lboro.ac.uk
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much more important role to e¢ ciency and productivity analysis than the focus
on high-powered incentives.
2. Evaluating recent regulation experience
In recent years, comparative e¢ ciency and productivity analysis, more com-
monly benchmarking, has become widely used by European, Latin American and
Australian network regulators as part of these regulatory regimes. This has gone
hand in hand with the wide adoption of forward looking incentive regulation often
based on price-capping or revenue-capping. The European Union Electricity Di-
rective of 2003 requires that ex ante regulation will become the norm throughout
the European Union, leading to wider use of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis
as noted by Filippini, Farsi, and Fetz (2005). Such regulation involves the setting
of a regulatory contract for subsequent years usually with a price or revenue cap
and a supporting comparative e¢ ciency analysis.
The general form of such price or revenue caps relates the upper limit on the
regulated price or total revenue to a base price or total cost base adjusted each
year by the rate of retail price ination (RPI) minus an X-factor or productivity
o¤set.
Price Cap : P = P0 (1 +RPI  X) (1)
Revenue Cap : R = C0 (1 +RPI  X) (2)
Scandinavian countries and the UK were among the rst to apply e¢ ciency and
productivity analysis techniques to regulating network industries, CEPA (2003a).
Sweden has used both non-parametric procedures and model network analysis
(MNA) to determine yardsticks of performance, while Finland and Norway have
used DEA explicitly in regulatory design for both rate of return regulation and
revenue capping, as described in Viljainen et al (2004). Subsequently, the Nether-
lands explicitly adopted DEA in setting price caps, and several Australian State
regulators such as the NSW Independent Price and Regulatory Tribunal, have fol-
lowed suit with increasingly more complex modelling procedures, IPART (1999),
Carrington et al (2002). Regulators usually state that e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis is integral to yardstick competition, and that the motivation for bench-
marking is the concern for incentives: e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt (2003:1609) interpret
regulatorsstated objectives as: The aim is to provide the regulated rms with
an incentive to close their e¢ ciency gap with the frontier rms. This is partly
done by publishing the results of the analysis, and partly by incorporating the
results explicitly into the determination of the regulations for the price or cost
base (P0; C0) and the X-factor in the price cap or a revenue cap. In pursuing this
objective, regulatory authorities have endeavoured to adopt procedures that are
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ideally supported by academic experts in the eld, Hargreaves et al (2006: 24),
and Bundesnetzagentur (2006).
The di¤erent regulatory case study evaluations have been able to identify four
key issues that recur frequently. These are
1. the choice of methodology
2. the nature of the sample of rms
3. the specication of the models, particularly the variables to be used
4. the translation of the results into the regulatory mechanism
Methodology
CEPA (2003a, 2003b), for example, notes that DEA, the parametric program-
ming approach, DFA, SFA, total factor productivity by growth accounting, and
DEA based Malmquist productivity growth measures have all been considered by
regulatory agencies. In practice, however the range of methodologies used has
been much narrower with DEA and COLS from cross-section samples playing ma-
jor roles in many of the recent regulatory studies. Viljainen et al (2004) review
seven case studies in electricity distribution and note that three used DEA, three
used model network analysis, and one used COLS. Filippini, Farsi, and Fetz (2005)
also comment on the prevalence of DEA and COLS in electricity. In the UK, COLS
has been the preferred methodology for the two major networks with a history of
price control reviews, water and electricity. Wherever SFA has been tried the re-
sults have been unusable due to the limited sample sizes employed, CEPA (2003a),
Pollitt (2005).
Sample size
Regulatory reviews have demonstrated little willingness to look beyond cross-
section samples of the national regulated rms in the year of the review. This
is despite the availability of large panel data sets or international comparators,
Carrington et al (2002). For example, both the UK water and electricity regulators
have access to rm level data for periods of 10 to 15 years but in each of their
price reviews have only examined cross-section samples of the small number of
regulated rms under their jurisdiction: around 25 in the case of UK water supply
and 14 in the case of UK electricity. In Scandinavian countries the sample sizes
are potentially much larger with a prevalence of local municipal networks, but
again cross-section sampling is preferred and the additional problem that these
producers (unlike the investor-owned-utilities) do not have the option of rejecting
the regulatory contract is ignored.
Specication
In the majority of cases studied, operating expenditure (OPEX) has been the
dominant concern of the regulatory e¢ ciency and productivity analysis. This has
been the case in all UK electricity reviews, in all but one of the UK water reviews
and in all but one of the Scandinavian cases cited by Filippini, Farsi, and Fetz
(2005). The key issue seems to the di¢ culty of dening a relevant measure of
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total cost (TOTEX) for the utilities in question. Partly this is a reporting is-
sue arising from laxity in dening regulatory accounting procedures, and partly
it arises because of the confusion between an economic model of the regulated
rm and the corporate nance model that is often preferred by regulators. In an
economic model of the rm, total cost is simply the value which the rms inputs
would have in comparable activities undertaken by other rms, i.e. total expen-
diture on volume measures of inputs (including capital services) at competitive
market input prices. In the typical regulatory model, total expenditure is dened
as:
TOTEX = OPEX +DEPRECIATION +RETURN ON CAPITAL(3)
Here RETURN ON CAPITAL is given by the real weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) multiplied by the value of assets relevant to the regulated activ-
ities or regulatory asset value (RAV). RAV itself is dynamically changing due to
the e¤ect of capital expenditure, CAPEX:
RAVt = RAVt 1 + CAPEX  DEPRECIATION (4)
In comparing TOTEX across di¤erent regulatory jurisdictions these denitions
can lead to non-comparable data, not least because of di¤erences in measuring
RAV. Viljainen et al (2004) report a variety of book value calculations used in
Scandinavian countries, while UK regulators have used equity market valuations
of RAV soon after privatisation to set the base gure. To overcome this, in their
comparison of international frontiers, Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) had to use OPEX
+ CAPEX as a current cash ow measure of TOTEX. Coelli et al (2003) and
Diewert and Lawrence (2002) o¤er clear guidance on capital measurement issues
but these have not been widely adopted by regulators.
Translation to price control
The benchmarked costs from an e¢ ciency and productivity analysis of reg-
ulated rms is then used to generate both the price or total cost base and the
X-factor, but again there seems no settled procedure for doing this, Burns Jenk-
ins and Riechmann (2005). Some regulators generate rm-specic X-factors as in
the case of UK water or the proposals for German electricity distribution, while
some generate a single X-factor for the industry with rm specic base prices (UK
electricity).
The evaluation of nearly two decades of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis
in regulation especially in Europe suggests that if the purpose is to dene widely
approved and transparent incentive procedures, then many regulators are failing
to set basic standards of comparison. There is a lack of clearly dened cost mea-
sures, a reluctance to adopt e¢ cient statistical procedures or econometric models
which are grounded in e¢ ciency and productivity analysis , a preference for small
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cross-section samples when international panel data are available, and a variety
of di¤erent ways of signalling the incentive levels which vary among regulatory
jurisdictions. This should make us examine the role of e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis more closely.
3. E¢ ciency and productivity analysis in incentive regulation
It can shown that yardstick competition does not necessarily require an analysis
of the e¢ cient frontier if the incentive mechanism is designed to ensure that the
regulated rm will minimise cost in its own sub-game, the level of the incentive is
immaterial.
Shleifer (1985) uses the average of the observed company costs but excluding
the cost of the rm in question to determine the regulated price: pi = ci, where:
ci =
P
j 6=i
cj
n  1 (5)
However, the price rule could be:
pi = min (c1; : : : ; ci 1; ci+1; : : : ; cn) (6)
or, alternatively,
pi = max (c1; : : : ; ci 1; ci+1; : : : ; cn) (7)
In the event that agents have di¤erent exogenous characteristics, x, Shleifer
suggests a regression procedure:
pi = ci + b
0 (xi   xi) (8)
Any of these mechanisms will result in each rm choosing to operate at the
rst best level of average cost3 , and receiving the same level of economic rent.
Bös (1991) on the other hand points out the obstacles to the yardstick compe-
tition outcome, which include: comparability issues amongst agents, techniques
and search costs, e.g. sampling error, measurement error, and omitted variables,
possible collusion amongst agents, lack of commitment by the principal to full
the incentive contract after the costs are observed, and restrictions on the size of
the penalty that can be imposed on a participating agent who does not reveal a
low cost technique of production.
In addition, it appears that despite statements about using e¢ ciency and pro-
ductivity analysis to develop transparent and widely acceptable incentives, many
regulators use primitive methods, small samples and ad hoc adjustments in ap-
plying benchmarking to determine the levels of the price control. It is important
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therefore to understand why this is happening. To accomplish this, it is helpful
to have a simple model of regulation in which e¢ ciency and productivity analy-
sis can be embedded, and, to keep the discussion simple, consider restricting the
theoretical analysis to linear regulatory contracts. All of the case studies in sec-
tion 2 of the paper use regulatory contracts which are linear. Three well known
and useful linear regulation models are Schmalensee (1989), also used by Joskow
(2005), Armstrong et al (1994) and Gasmi et al (1994). These models are very
close to each other in structure and results, and that of Armstrong et al (1994) is
taken as representative4 . The basic denitions and results are shown here, with
the justication left to the appendix.
The regulator seeks to set a price (or revenue) control by relating the regulated
price, P to the observed cost, c, without observing managerial e¤ort, e, which can
also be regarded as productive e¢ ciency. P can represent either average or total
revenue, and c can represent either average or total cost and a linear model is:
P = P + (1  ) c (9)
P is the xed element of the price control, and the parameter  is called the
incentive power of the control. The higher the value of  the weaker the relationship
between the price or revenue cap and the rms observed cost.
In the case of a single regulated rm, the regulator chooses
 
P ; 

to minimise
the level of the price cap or revenue cap to the rm, taking e¤ort, e, as given by
the rms choice, The rm chooses e to maximise its utility taking
 
P ; 

as given
by the regulators choice. Assume the disutility of e¤ort function, known to the
regulator, is  (e) with derivative equal to marginal disutility of e¤ort: 0 (e). This
enables the regulator to take this function into account when designing a price
control. Although the regulator cannot observe e¤ort, he knows that cost, which
can be veried, depends on both e¤ort and a random variable, outside the rms
control. Therefore:
c =    e (10)
The regulation problem is that there is not a perfect correlation between the
rms e¤ort or productive e¢ ciency and its observed cost: rce < 1 . However,
the parameters of the distribution of the random component in cost are common
knowledge:
~d
 
; 2

(11)
The rms prot is revenue5 minus cost and the disutility cost of e¤ort.
 = P   c   (e) (12)
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Regulator chooses ( )r,P  to minimise the price of output
High power, 1=r intermediate power, 10 << r low power, 0=r
Firm chooses *e  to maximise expected utility using the probability distribution of q
      Or, depending on its reservation utility 0U , firm rejects the price control on offer
Nature randomly draws the production conditions, cost is observed: ec -= q  and the
actual price is set at: ( )cPP r-+= 1 , while the firm collects its actual profit and
utility.
Figure 1 Extensive form of a regulation game
Will the rm accept the contract and participate in the game? This will depend
on its reservation utility , which is the amount of utility (in monetary terms) that
it could gain in an alternative economic activity. Finally the rms utility function
indicates that it enjoys economic rent but dislikes its variability.
U = E ()  
2
var  (13)
The extensive form of the game is illustrated in gure 1.
It can be seen that this is a two stage game, with the regulator choosing the
price control parameters rst, then the rm choosing the e¤ort level when it knows
these parameters and if it accepts the regulatory contract, by operating on the basis
of expectations about the random variable that will a¤ect production conditions.
Begin with the rms sub-game, taking the regulators choice of
 
P ; 

as given.
The utility maximising rm chooses e¤ort to reect the incentive power of the
regulatory contract by setting the marginal disutility of e¤ort to whatever value 
of the regulator has chosen.
 0 (e) =  (14)
Substituting e = e () into the utility function, the rms equilibrium ex-
pected utility level from participating in the game depends on the regulators price
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control formula, the mean and variance (risk) of the random variable representing
production conditions, and the managers risk aversion coe¢ cient,.
i.e.:
U = U
 
P ; ;; 2; 

(15)
The regulators subgame has the following solution: choose
 
P ; 

given that
 0 (e) = , and ensuring that the participation constraint will be satised: U  
U0  0
The solution is the pair of parameters:
 = 
 
2; 

(16)
and
P

= P

(U0; ;) = P
  
U0;; 
2; 

(17)
Interpret as follows. The variable part of the price control depends on the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the amount of risk represented by the variance of
the random variable. The xed part Pdepends on three factors: the reservation
utility that must be covered to induce participation in the game U0, the mean
of the random variable representing production conditions , and the variable
incentive power part of the price control . If the principal chooses the value of
sub-optimally, say by opting for a high-powered contract  = 1when the agent is
risk averse, then all that happens is that the expected utility of the agent will be
reduced, @U

@ < 0, and non-participation, i.e. rejection of the regulators contract
becomes more likely6 . If the agent does participate nevertheless, e¤ort will be
higher than in the case of optimal choice of . In summary the e¤ect of choosing
a sub-optimally high powered contract is:
0 >  =) U 0 < U; but e0 > e (18)
For investor-owned utilities, the share-holders can reject a regulatory contract
by selling their equity in the rm to other participants who will take on the reg-
ulators contract at a reduced share price. This possibility is closed o¤ when
the regulated rms are local municipal networks as is often the case in European
regulatory jurisdictions.
The model can extend to yardstick competition. An example is the regulation
of several regional water supply companies, or several regional electricity distrib-
ution monopolies.
Armstrong et al (1994) suggest a regulatory price formula that takes the form:
P = P + (1  ) ci +  (kcj) (19)
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Here the price control for rm i contains a xed element, plus a weighted aver-
age of its own observed marginal cost and a proportion (k) of the observed marginal
cost of another comparable rm j. The regulator is engaged in two simultaneous
2-stage games with each company. How does this change the solution?
Begin by thinking of the relationship between the costs of the rms. For two
rms, we have:
ci = i   ei; i = 1; 2 (20)
Consequently it is still the case that there is less than perfect correlation be-
tween observed cost and e¤ort or productive e¢ ciency: rce < 1. A simplication is
to assume that the variance of the random variable is the same for both rms, and
to write: cov (ci; cj) = r2, where ris the correlation coe¢ cient between the ran-
dom variables representing productive conditions in each of the two rms. Each
rm independently sets the marginal disutility of e¤ort equal to the regulators
choice of the cost pass through parameter:
 0 (ei ) =  (21)
Consequently, the regulator expects each rm to adopt the same e¤ort level or
productive e¢ ciency level in equilibrium unless each has very di¤erent prefer-
ences about the disutility of e¤ort. The regulator has three variables to consider:
k is the proportion of the other companys observed cost which is weighted in with
the regulated companys marginal cost; P ;  are the xed part of the price control
and the incentive power of the optimal contract. The solution for kis very simple:
k = r (22)
the proportion of the other rms cost which is counted is equal to the corre-
lation coe¢ cient between the random variables determining the production con-
ditions. This solution also impacts on the others:
 = 
 
2; ; r

(23)
and
P

= P

(U0; ;) = P
  
U0;; 
2; ; r

(24)
The major impact lies in the correlation between the random variables repre-
senting production conditions. If r = 0, then the optimal contract reduces to the
single agent case. If r = 1, then the optimal contract reduces to:
P = P (U0) (25)
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 = 1 (26)
Pi = P + cj (27)
The rm has the highest incentive power because  = 1and it keeps all of the
cost savings it makes from reducing its own costs. This is the maximum incentive
power even if the rm is risk averse and faces highly variable costs whatever its
e¤ort level. It is however fully insured because it can pass on the full level of costs
observed from its competitors in the yardstick mechanism, and it receives the same
revenue whatever the state of the world, and the level of its own marginal cost7 .
The decision about the power of the regulatory contract entirely determines
the rms e¤ort in reducing cost. If the regulator chooses a value for the power
parameter that does not reect the rms preferences, then the achieved level of
utility will be lower and the participation constraint will be violated. Setting a
contract that is too high powered simply leads to fewer participants accepting the
regulatory contract.
In practice however, e¢ ciency and productivity analysis plays a major role in
both the single rm and multiple rm case. The model treats the regulators sub-
game as an analytical optimisation exercise, but this does not generalise to reality.
In the real world, each regulator needs a numerical algorithm to determine the level
of the price or revenue control that meets the regulatory objective of minimising
the capture of economic rent from consumers by the regulated rm subject to the
nancial viability of the participating rms that accept the contract. Since an
analytical solution is not available in reality, the numerical algorithm must focus
on the participation constraint; for example, in the multiple rm case this is:
U
 
P ; ; k
  U0  0 (28)
Treating U0 as the money metric required for nancial viability, e¢ ciency
and productivity analysis can be used to determine a numerical approximation
to the feasible level of [U   U0], i.e. the amount of economic rent or slack that
can be feasibly transferred from nancially viable regulated rms if each locates
on the e¢ cient frontier. This e¢ ciency change is conditional on the power of
the regulatory contract that is in place. Regulatory benchmarking is needed,
therefore, to determine a feasible numerical solution to the regulators problem
of determining the optimal transfer of economic rent. In summary, e¢ ciency and
productivity analysis is a device for capturing economic rent.
When e¢ ciency and productivity analysis is understood in this context, it
helps to shed light on the some of the curious economic specications adopted in
real world regulatory cases. Four issues were isolated in section 2 of this paper:
methodology, sample size, specication and translation. Since the regulator can
use e¢ ciency and productivity analysis for rent capture, he or she will prefer a
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methodology that sets a very challenging target for the rms to appeal against
if the cost-benet ratio of judicial appeal does not deter them. Consequently,
methodologies may favour primitive methods such as COLS. The regulator is aware
that he or she is only permitted to capture rent from the current cross-section of
rms. Previous observations, as in panel data, or rms in other jurisdictions, as in
international samples, o¤er no candidates for rent transfer, and may only serve to
make the current cross-section look as if it has relatively little slack compared to
a wide international panel. Regulators therefore may prefer small national cross-
section samples to correspond to the small sample open-envelopment methodolo-
gies which have also been used. In considering the specication of the TOTEX
variable the regulator will operate in terms of the corporate nance model that the
capital market uses consequently this may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Finally, the regulator will tailor the translation of the rent capture to the capital
market response that will apply to the rms under jurisdiction, consequently lead-
ing to di¤erent forms of glide-path and price control. Therefore viewing e¢ ciency
and productivity analysis as a numerical algorithm, which is used to substitute for
an analytical solution to devise the level of the price cap that captures economic
rent, makes more sense of how it has been applied in the real world than thinking
of it only as a form of incentive signal.
Two additional issues further complicate the role of e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis in regulation, and these will impact on the amount of economic rent that
can be captured in a single frontier e¢ ciency study. These issues are quality of
supply and dynamic regulation. Firms may substitute between care for quality
and cost reduction, so that the rm must be given a lower powered contract, or
additional intermediate power contracts related to quality issues must be avail-
able when a high-powered contract applies to the regulated price. La¤ont and
Tirole (1993) argue that where the regulated rm is forward looking and sensitive
to its reputation in repeated supply of service then more high-powered schemes
may be used. It is essential therefore to include quality of supply measurement
when assessing e¢ ciency and productivity analysis applications to regulation. Re-
peated regulatory review also raises the key issue of dynamic regulation which
does complicate matters signicantly.
Regulators and rms are in practice engaged in repeated interactions, with
possibly xed periods, e.g. of ve years, between regulatory reviews. The key is
the extent to which the regulator can perfectly commit to the regulatory contracts
o¤ered in the rst period. If this is assumed to be so, then the regulator and rm
can sign a long term contract which simply replicates the static incentive com-
patible mechanisms in each period. However such commitment is unlikely for two
reasons according to La¤ont and Tirole: most jurisdictions have legal restrictions
on the ability of regulators to sign such long term contracts  the political and
consumer pressures are likely to be too strong, and the problem of incomplete con-
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tingent contracts arises whereby unforeseen events lead to re-contracting. Crew
and Kleinfdorfer (2002) have argued strongly that lack of credible commitment
undermines the incentive compatible mechanism approach to regulation. In this
case the rm may fear, and the regulator favour, a ratchet e¤ect whereby the reg-
ulator tightens the constraint on the rm as it builds up experience of the rms
capability.
A general way round this problem of the breakdown of incentive compatible
regulation, arising from the imperfect ability of the regulator to commit to a long
term contract, is to be unable to use the information from the rst period. Reg-
ulators nd it benecial to delay making use of the frontier e¢ ciency information
learned in the repetitions of the game perhaps by preserving the rms initial
incentives over several periods, or increasing the length of time between reviews.
4. Regulatory Benchmarking with DEA
In a series of papers by Peter Bogetoft and others, see especially Bogetoft
(1997) and Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind (2000), the authors explore the relationship
between yardstick competition and the use of data envelopment analysis, DEA
which has been one of the most widely used methods of comparative e¢ ciency
measurement amongst regulated utilities. Among n di¤erent utilities the typical
rm is observed to have input expenditures of w0x where x is a vector of inputs
and w is a vector of input prices, a vector of outputs y and possibly a vector of
non-controllable inputs z. This data is veriable in the sense that the regulator can
measure and check the data on outputs, input expenditures and non-controllable
inputs. The regulator contracts with the rms at the beginning of the game to
pay a revenue cap b according to a formula that depends on the observed costs
and outputs of the rms.
The utility (but not the regulator) knows the minimal cost of using current
technological possibilities to produce the outputs given the inputs, input prices
and non-controllable inputs:
C (yjz; w) = min
x
fw0x : xand z can make yg (29)
The rm (or the managers) can choose a degree of slack, s, which is also
unknown to the regulator, so that the actual cost experienced by the rm is:
C (yjz; w) + s (30)
The regulated rms ex-ante utility is assumed to depend on the di¤erence
between (i) its allowed revenue cap b and its actual veried input expenditure
w0x, plus (ii) a fraction8 'of the di¤erence between the expenditure on inputs and
the cost (including slack) of producing its output target:
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.
U = b  w0x+ ' (w0x  C (yjz; w)  s) (31)
where the strict inequalities 0 < ' < 1are satised. The slack is consumed
by the rm in converting inputs into outputs using the available technological
possibilities. The restrictions on the marginal utility of the slack, ', ensure that at
the margin the rm prefers to increase prot rather than to consume slack although
both yield positive utility. The regulator is unaware of the minimal cost function,
but knows or estimates the rms marginal utility of slack, and endeavours to
minimise the informational rent paid to each regulated rm through the revenue
cap.
The result is that generally an optimal (individually rational and incentive
compatible) revenue cap contract which will minimise the amount of informational
rent to be paid to the rms takes the following form for each rm:
b = w0x+ ' (c   w0x) (32)
i.e.
b = 'c + (1  ')w0x (33)
where c is a best practice cost normor minimal extrapolation cost stan-
dard set to act as a benchmark for the rm. The benchmark must provide an
upper bound on the informational rent paid to the rm so it is essentiak that it
at least exceeds the minimal technological cost of production:
c  C (yjz; w) (34)
Consequently it is required that c is the least upper bound of the possible
values of the cost of production. Without knowing the minimal technological cost
of production the regulator has to nd the least upper bound of the set which
contains this unknown function. The observed input expenditures, outputs and
non-controllable inputs of the rms that are subject to the yardstick competi-
tion can provide information about this least upper bound. In particular, under
assumptions of disposability and convexity of the production possibility set, the
DEA e¢ cient cost under constant returns to scale, CDEA CRS could be a candi-
date for c: However, for incentive reasons the benchmark should exclude the cost
and output of the rm in question from the reference set for which the frontier is
calculated. In this respect the suggestion replicates the DEA model of Andersen
and Petersen (1993) which was initially suggested as a way to rank rms all of
which are e¢ cient according to the standard DEA model. In general however,
these arguments provide both a model of yardstick competition and an analytical
justication for using the DEA frontier e¢ ciency measure.
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An issue that dominates the debate on methods of e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis in practice is the non-stochastic aspect of DEA. Procedures have been
developed to address the problem, notably by Simar (2003), Simar and Wilson
(2000) and Banker (1993), but also by Land, Lovell, and Thore (1993), and Lovell
(1993), Ruggiero (2004), and Seaver and Triantis (1989). Nevertheless it is di¢ cult
to nd any major regulatory use of stochastic developments in DEA by regulators,
and the fundamental division between DEA and econometric approaches remains
to be addressed in the future by many regulators.
5. Regulatory Benchmarking with Parametric SFA
The simple model of the agents observed marginal or average cost can be
expressed in terms of the notation used in econometric models of performance
measurement9 .
c = + u+ v (35)
where the variables are:
: the frontier level of cost (  = E (c) = + xin a regression framework)
u: the agents chosen level of e¤ort or ine¢ ciency
v: stochastic error e.g. measurement error, sampling error, omitted variables
The interpretation of the ine¢ ciency term as a choice variable with a pre-
dictable outcome in the principal agent model is recognisable as one of the ar-
guments used by Leibenstein (1966) to explain X-E¢ ciency, and as the major
component of the Farrell (1983) analysis of X-E¢ ciency.
In performance measurement there is the advantage of observing several agents
and the regulator can use their individual costs or outputs as benchmarks. With
two comparators, costs are:
ci = i + ui + vi (36)
and
cj = j + uj + vj (37)
Suppose stochastic factors are absent, and that costs vary only because the
di¤erent agents operate with di¤erent levels of ine¢ ciency.
ci = i + ui (38)
The correlation between observed cost and ine¢ ciency is exactly equally to 1.
rcu = 1 (39)
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Rasmusen (2001: 171) concludes: unobservability of e¤ort is not a problem
in itself, if the contract can be conditioned on something which is observable
and perfectly correlated with e¤ort. The true agency problem occurs when that
correlation breaks down
Consequently, while there is a measurement problem to be resolved when sto-
chastic factors are absent, nevertheless this specication does not address the true
problem of modelling the behaviour of agents who are better informed than the
principal. It is the presence of other stochastic factors that cause di¢ culties for the
principal or regulator. In Rasmusens (2001: 171) words:  because of uncertainty
about the state of the world, e¤ort does not map cleanly onto the observed output.
Adapting the Armstrong et al (1994) model to consider the correlation between
observed cost and ine¢ ciency when the observation also contains stochastic error:
ci = i + ui + vi (40)
Now the correlation is:
rcu =
r
var u
var v + var u
< 1 (41)
and
rcu  ! 0 as var u  ! 0 (42)
The observation on cost provides a partial but imperfect source of information
about ine¢ ciency, and the correlation is weaker the smaller the proportion of cost
variation that is accounted for by ine¢ ciency. This is now exactly the nature of
the principal-agent problem, and it is exactly captured by the stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) model of performance measurement.
Suppose both agents have accepted the regulators incentive contract, and that
this contract requires that the performance benchmark for one agent is the ob-
served cost of the other. If the agents do not di¤er strongly in their aversion to
e¤ort or increased e¢ ciency, their response to improved incentives will very similar
at the margin. Then, it is likely that they will choose very similar levels of e¤ort
or e¢ ciency. This time look at the correlation of their observed costs:
rcicj =
cov (uiuj) + cov (uivj) + cov (vjui) + cov (vivj)p
var ui + var vi
p
var uj + var vj
(43)
=
cov (uiuj)p
var ui + var vi
p
var uj + var vj
> 0
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This correlation, in a Nash equilibrium of the yardstick competition game is
likely to be relatively high, especially if the two rms are subject to similarly dis-
tributed stochastic errors. It is still assumed that stochastic errors and ine¢ ciency
are independent of each other.
Now consider what the standard models of performance measurement have
to say about these same correlation coe¢ cients between observed cost and inef-
ciency, and between the observed cost of di¤erent companies. The answers are
not necessarily the same as the game theory predictions.
The COLS model of ine¢ ciency measurement and the DEA model as well,
emphasise ine¢ ciency as the main or sole factor explaining performance variability:
ci = i + ui (44)
so that:
rcu = 1 (45)
Consequently, we should expect COLS to be an inadequate guide to situations
which are best modelled as principal-agent games. On the other hand the SFA
model explicitly sets out a composed error model of output or cost. For example
in the normal-half normal case
ci = + xi + "i (46)
"i = ui + vi (47)
ui~NID
+
 
0; 2u

; i = 1 : : : n (48)
vi~NID
 
0; 2v

; i = 1 : : : n (49)
The objective is to estimate the following parameters:
 =
u
v
(50)
or
 =
2u
2u + 
2
v
(51)
These are exactly the relationships at the core of the game theory model of
principal and agent. Although other forms of hypothesis are in fact used, never-
theless, the basic hypothesis testing procedure of the SFA model can be expressed
as:
H0 : rcu = 0 (52)
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against:
H1 : rcu > 0 (53)
Rejecting H0 in favour of H1 is equivalent to nding signicant levels of inef-
ciency in the performance data. In this context, note that COLS is not a useful
substitute if estimation of the SFA model breaks down. SFA may break down for
several reasons, especially, for example, small sample size. This leads to failure to
reject H0 : rcu = 0. Replacing SFA with COLS corresponds to the strategy of as-
suming: rcu = 1 . So far, the SFA model is a better reection of the principal-agent
problem than the COLS model.
However, the SFA model deviates strongly from the game theory model in
its prediction about the correlation between the observed cost of di¤erent rms.
The SFA model, as shown above, includes the assumption that the components
of the composed error are independently distributed. This implies zero correla-
tion between both the ine¢ ciency and stochastic error components of di¤erent
disturbance terms.
rcicj =
cov (uiuj) + cov (uivj) + cov (vjui) + cov (vivj)p
var ui + var vi
p
var uj + var vj
= 0 (54)
If this were not true then we would have the problem of error terms that were
correlated with each other in cross section samples. The SFA model therefore is
designed to capture a situation in which agents display di¤erent, non-correlated,
ine¢ ciency outcomes. This is completely di¤erent from the usual principal-agent
framework. A tempting supporting argument is that if the di¤erent agents have
di¤erent risk-e¤ort preference structures, then an optimum could be found in
which each agent received a di¤erent incentive contract designed for his/her prefer-
ences, in which case we would expect to observe di¤erent, non-correlated e¢ ciency
choices. But this argument is faulty, because the nature of the game has changed
into one in which agents may have an incentive to falsify the signals about their
preferences. It does not provide an escape route from the dilemma that the SFA
model is based on an assumption that is not compatible with one prediction of
standard principal-agent game theory. A nding of ine¢ ciency in the SFA model
may be an indicator that the underlying principal-agent game has not been solved
e¢ ciently, or that non-optimal contracting arrangements are being used.
Developing this theme of the relationship between the SFA model of ine¢ ciency
and the asymmetric information game, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) investigate the
relationship between the specication of the SFA model and the principal agent,
PA, framework for regulatory economics. These authors extend the application of
the PA model to include both hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information
(adverse selection). They envisage a model identical to the Armstrong et al model
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except for the addition of an idiosyncratic error term leading to a model in which
the composed error term has three components, e.g.:
" = u+ v =    e+ v (55)
Here v is the usual idiosyncratic error, but their ine¢ ciency term has two
components: is exogenous technical ine¢ ciency, and e  0is the e¤ort productiv-
ity exerted by the rm. Their PA model states that the regulated rms utility
is:
U = t0 +  (R  C (e; ))   (e) (56)
 2 f0; 1g (57)
The term t0 is a xed sum reecting the resource transfer to the rm which
would be required to ensure that expected revenues covered expected costs. The
term  (e)is the usual disutility of e¤ort and the term  (R  C (e; ))reects the
amount of the rms positive or negative prots retained by the rm. The incentive
power of the regulatory contract is given by the term ; a zero value indicates a
cost plus contract with the regulator bearing all of the risk, while a value of 1
indicates that the rm bears all of the risk. Gagnepain and Ivaldi demonstrate
that when this model is used to derive the rms cost frontier relating cost Cto
explanatory regressors x, the result is 10 :
lnC =  [terms in ; x;  (e)] + (1  ) [terms in ; x] = v (58)
With a low powered regulatory contract  = 0the usual classical least squares
model can be applied, but with a high powered incentive contract the values of
the explanatory variables x, i.e. input prices and outputs, are endogenised. In
other words they become correlated with the e¤ort level chosen by the rm. Since
this e¤ort level forms part of the ine¢ ciency component of the SFA model, we can
summarise by the result:
rxu 6= 0 (59)
This endogeneity issue could be serious and will lead to inconsistent estimates
of the regression coe¢ cients as well as di¢ culty in identifying the ine¢ ciency
arising from low e¤ort. The endogeneity of the ine¢ ciency term and its e¤ect on
the regression explanatory variables requires the regulator to think carefully about
how the model is estimated. Two procedures are available. Gagnepain and Ivaldi
prefer an approach that explicitly derives the appropriate log likelihood function
based on particular assumptions about the specication of the e¤ort disutility,
and the production function, as well as assumptions about the error components
themselves. They derive a Cobb-Douglas based example for estimation11 . A
simpler approach (also noted by Gagnepain and Ivaldi) is to use a xed e¤ects,
FE, panel data model.
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6. Scale and Envelopment Issues in Regulatory Applications
In practical regulation cases, the e¤ect of returns to scale becomes an issue.
One source of ine¢ cient performance may be that the regulated rms are con-
strained by history or regulation to be sub-optimal in size. Regulators may debate
whether to treat the scale of rms as outside their control, or to penalise rms
for apparently choosing to remain at a sub-optimal size, see Burns et al (2005),
and CEPA (2003b). Partly this concern arises because the DEA approach seems
to o¤er the regulator the option of whether or not to include scale e¢ ciency as a
target. Figure 2 illustrates an example of a regulatory study that has total cost
as the input and seeks to measure technical e¢ ciency relative to output, assuming
that all the rms face the same input prices.
VRS and CRS frontiers are shown in gure 2. Take an observed rm with data
point: (Qi, Ci). Its DEA-CRS e¢ ciency is 
CRS = [LQi / CQi]. Its DEA-VRS
e¢ ciency is V RS = [SQi / CQi]. If the rms target performance is set relative
to the CRS frontier, it will be much more demanding than for the VRS frontier,
and the implication is that the rm will be able to adjust its size to generate
the e¢ ciency improvements that the regulator is looking for. For example, such
a requirement was assumed by the UK Postal Regulator in benchmarking the
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individual centres of the monopoly rm UK Royal Mail. However, the ability to
alter scale may be very limited for the rm in practice and therefore the size of
the e¢ ciency gain targeted by the regulator may simply not be feasible. Figure 2
illustrates another issue, the assumed orientation of the e¢ ciency analysis. In an
input orientation, the rm shown appears to lie in the area of increasing returns
to scale, but in an output orientation the rm lies in an area of constant returns
to scale. Färe et al (1994: 122-3) discuss this phenomenon which arises because
of ambiguity about the meaning of scale e¢ ciency.
Can the same problem be assessed in parametric approaches, i.e. can the
regulator distinguish between e¢ ciency relative to di¤erent scale assumptions? In
the econometric model of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis, the approach has to
be di¤erent because a regression line is tted with VRS as the default assumption.
Fitting a CRS function to the same data will result in specication bias if CRS
is not a valid assumption for this sample of data or this data generating process.
Restricting the variables in the tted VRS cost function will not produce the CRS
e¤ect properly. However an alternative approach is the following. The long run
total cost curve embodies variable returns to scale, while the short run total cost
curve by denition keeps some factors xed at their current scale level. It is then
possible in principle to derive the short run total cost curve by restricting the
functional form of the tted long run cost curve.
Chambers (1988) sets this out as follows, where y is a vector of outputs, x is
a vector of inputs, w is a vector of input prices, and C is observed total input
expenditure. In the long run, total cost is given by minimisimg input expenditure
subject to the technology represented by a parametric production function
c (w; y) = min
x
(w0x : y  f (x)) (60)
Now partition the inputs into variable and xed inputs respectively, x = 
x1 : x2

.
The short run variable cost is:
cv
 
w1; y; x2

= min
x
 
w10x1 : y  f  x1;x2 (61)
while short run total cost is :
cs
 
w; y; x2

= cv
 
w1; y; x2

+ w02x2 (62)
By consequence of the additional constraint on the cost minimisation:
cv
 
w1; y; x2

+ w02x2  c (w; y) (63)
from which the Le Chatelier - Samuelson- principle allows the derivation of the
familiar envelope cost function property:
c (w; y) = min
x2

cv
 
w1; y; x2

+ w02x2

(64)
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However this property holds at every point on the long run total cost function,
not only at minimum e¢ cient scale (or Most Productive Plant Size, MPSS in DEA
terms).
Then the corresponding idea in parametric econometric analysis to the ideas
of VRS and CRS e¢ ciency in DEA would be:
Short run efficiency : SRE :

cv
 
w1; y; x2

+ w02x2

C
(65)
and
long run efficiency : LRE :
c (w; y)
C
(66)
With particular parametric functional forms it is possible to derive the ex-
pression

cv
 
w1; y; x2

+ w02x2

from knowledge of c (w; y) so that econometric
estimation can in principle be used to derive these corresponding ideas, if very
strong assumptions are made about the specication of the technology. However,
the assumptions are likely to be so strong that regulatory challenges are almost
certain. A preferable approach to addressing scale issues in parametric approaches
is the scale adjusted decomposition of total factor productivity used by Coelli et
al (2003), and Saal et al (2004) and based on Orea (2002). However this requires
the availability of panel data.
One of the motivating forces in DEA is the aim of showing the producer in
the best light. By constructing e¢ ciency measures relative to a piecewise linear
representation of the production technology, DEA o¤ers the closet envelopment of
the data under di¤erent assumption regimes, and this was demonstrated earlier
in this paper. In fact Petersen (1990) has argued that closest envelopment is an
extremely desirable property of he DEA approach to e¢ ciency measurement. The
regulatory purpose is to give the benet of doubt to the regulated rm, Agrell and
Bogetoft (2006)
Is there a corresponding idea in parametric econometric approaches to e¢ -
ciency? The idea is important in a regulatory context because of the possibility of
sub-optimal choice of the power of the regulatory contract which can lead to the
non-participation of some rms. An econometric frontier has an entirely di¤erent
conception, but the idea of looking at its envelopment properties is neverthe-
less possible, and arose in submissions to the UK water regulators 2004 review,
Weyman-Jones et al (2006). In many European regulatory applications, it has
already been shown that small sample and outlier-dominated procedures such as
COLS have been used for constructing the e¢ cient frontier. However COLS and
similar regression frontiers are point estimators of the frontier, and it is possible
to base a closest envelopment parametric frontier on an alternative interval esti-
mation approach. This has a regulatory advantage in two ways. First, it allows
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance 22
iyln
COLS
CIUB
Figure 3 Prediction Interval around the COLS cost frontier
iCln
for the possibility that in opting for a high powered contract, the regulator may
be extracting a sub-optimal amount of economic rent from risk averse rms, and
therefore discouraging participation, and secondly, by incorporating sample second
moment properties of the data it takes some account of the risk aversion of the
regulated rms. The procedure described also o¤ers an incentive to regulators to
improve the quality of the benchmarking process.
The essential idea is illustrated in gure 3.
Take a small sample cross-section case such as those examined in section 2
of the paper. A COLS cost frontier has been constructed passing through the
observation with the minimum OLS residual. Since the COLS frontier is a parallel
displacement of the tted OLS regression, a prediction interval can be constructed
around the COLS frontier which is simply a parallel displacement of the OLS
prediction interval. Instead of the COLS point estimator of the frontier, this
prediction interval is an interval estimator of the frontier conditional on a pre-
determined condence level. The interpretation is developed as follows.
Fit the OLS regression:
lnCi = c0 +c1 ln yi: (67)
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Dene two sets of ine¢ cient observations. Firms which lie above the COLS
frontier and are therefore regarded as ine¢ cient are in the set:UCOLS
UCOLS =
n
lnCi > lncCi +min (ei) ; i = 1 : : : no (68)
Firms which lie above the 100 (1  )% condence interval upper bound on
the COLS regression are in the set UCIUB
UCIUB =
8<: lnCi > lncCi +min (ei) + t2
r
est var

lnCi   lncCi ;
i = 1 : : : n
9=;(69)
UCIUB has approximately12 the property that if samples are repeatedly drawn
and c0 + c1 ln yi + min (ei) is calculated each time. then, in 100  2 % of the
samples, lnCi will be contained in UCIUB , even if e¢ cient. Since lnCi is the
dependent variable, the variance term can be re-scaled as suggested by Greene
(2003:112). In general, there will be considerably fewer observations in UCIUBthan
in UCOLS , and their average e¢ ciency should be considerably higher. This gives
an approximate condence level for stating that an observation is ine¢ cient.
Since the size of the condence interval is greater the greater is the residual
variance, the smaller the sample, and the more extreme is the value of the explana-
tory variable used to evaluate the distance of the chosen rm from the frontier.,
this interval estimator of the frontier produces corresponding incentives for the
regulator. To capture more economic rent, the regulator is required to increase
the sample size, improve the precision of the estimate of the frontier, make al-
lowance for rms distant from the mean, and state an explicit degree of condence
in the determination of whether a rm is ine¢ cient.
If the upper bound of this prediction interval is taken as the frontier, the result
is a performance target with the following properties:
1. It is more harsh for the rms (implying higher average ine¢ ciency scores)
the lower degree of condence that is required
2. It is more harsh for the rms (implying higher average ine¢ ciency scores)
the smaller the unexplained variation in the residuals.
Take the upper bound of the condence limits to preserve the incentive to
participate in the regulatory game. This has the e¤ect of beneting the rms if
the t is weak and the condence level is required to be high. The conclusion of
using this interval estimator of the frontier is that, if all of the sample variation
is attributed to ine¢ ciency, than it is possible to be condent on the basis of
the estimated equation that only the observations in the set are ine¢ cient. The
impact on the participation incentives of regulated companies could be substantial.
Depending on the condence level chosen, a restricted number of rms may be
found to be ine¢ cient, compared with the very substantial ine¢ ciency scores set
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for the COLS estimator of the frontier. It remains true that the analysis assumes
that all of the residual variation is due to ine¢ ciency, since the SFA model has
not been applied. However, the location of the frontier explicitly takes account of
the goodness of t in the sample.
When larger samples are available, then the interval estimator of the frontier
can be applied in a stochastic frontier analysis model. Horrace and Schmidt (1996)
and Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1996) demonstrate condence inter-
vals for technical e¢ ciency which can be applied to develop interval estimates of
the e¢ cient frontier for regulatory purposes.
7. E¢ ciency and Productivity Analysis in Governance
E¢ ciency and productivity analysis is becoming widely used in the public sec-
tor, Fox (2002). In this area, the purpose and issues in e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis are very di¤erent from their application in regulation. Providing incen-
tives to owners of rms does not arise, and managerial reward conditions in the
public sector have historically been limited. A notable recent exception in UK has
been the linking of medical practitionerssalaries in the UK National Health Ser-
vice to evidence of quality of patient care, Atkinson (2005).One issue that remains
consistent is to explain the divergence in raw performance by di¤erent public agen-
cies such as education and health services. For example in many European public
services, it is common to develop league tablesof performance by schools, col-
leges, hospitals and emergency services. The purpose of e¢ ciency and productivity
analysis is then to reconcile the di¤erences in performance by the identication
and inclusion of exogenous operating characteristics until the raw di¤erences are
reduced, Vignoles et al (2000).
A major problem for e¢ ciency and productivity analysis in Government and
public sector activity is the denition of output. Atkinson (2005) notes that there
is a long history in many countries of the public sectors use of the denition:
output = input. The Atkinson review is a major attempt by the UK Government
to address the issue of nding direct measures of public sector outputs. The
European Commission has directed that public sector outputs must be measured
directly for inclusion in the national accounts of members of the European Union,
but this requires massive research e¤orts to achieve. Lovell (2002) notes that the
reason why output = input is so frequently used is that public sector outputs are
usually un-priced, and that quality indicators are undened. Education and health
provision are two areas where performance measurement using frontier methods
is widely adopted, Greene (2005), Vignoles et al (2000), and where the issue of
output denition has to be widely addressed otherwise ine¢ ciency is always zero,
and productivity is by denition always unity. Greene (2005) demonstrates the
need for careful denition of health delivery output in a World Health Organization
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panel dataset by using a composite measure of success in meeting ve health service
goals. Atkinson (2005) notes that prior to 2004, UK National Health Service
output was measured by the number of inpatient and day-cases, accounting for
about half of national input expenditure. The Atkinson review recommended the
adoption of quality adjusted health years and health outcomes as measures of
output. In education, previous UK Government practice used school enrolments
as the output measure in the national accounts and Atkinson recommended an
immediate change to school attendances. There is a quality adjustment in most
education output measures, but it is often based on a single years attainment at
the end of schooling, and Atkinson recommended an ongoing quality attainment
adjustment throughout the studentslife. In public good provision, the denition
of output becomes particularly di¢ cult since a key non-rival and non-excludable
aspect of such public services as re and police protection is the availability of the
service on call. It is almost inevitable, as Atkinson recognised, that this output will
have an input dimension, and may possibly need to be related to population size,
De Borger et al (1994). Although output measurement has been the major issue
in applying e¢ ciency and productivity analysis to the governance sector, input
measurement also turns out to be a major problem. In computing e¢ ciency and
productivity in the public sector, volume measures of input are derived by deating
input expenditures by input price indexes. E¢ ciency measures become sensitive
to the choice of deator but input price deators which are relevant specically to
the public sector are particularly di¢ cult to use, and this is especially problematic
in the measurement of the price index of capital. Diewert and Lawrence (2002)
provide one of the clearest guides to measuring capital costs for e¢ ciency and
productivity analysis.
8. Lessons from regulation and governance
It is tempting to close this survey of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis in
regulation and governance with a list of major conclusions, but it is clear that a
large number of issues are unresolved. The successful application of e¢ ciency and
productivity analysis in practice has not kept up with the development of the the-
oretical and empirical methodology. The overwhelming impression of regulatory
and governance case studies is that sample size, variable choice, model specication
and choice of methodology has been governed by di¤erent objectives from those
of the theoretical literature. The nature of regulatory games gives some insight to
this. Although the theoretical research interest is in performance measurement for
improved e¢ ciency, in actual regulatory applications the purpose has been feasi-
ble capture of economic rent from rms under the regulators jurisdiction. This
does form part of the wider picture of e¢ ciency and productivity analysis but
leads to di¤erent model choice and specications from those pursued by academic
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researchers. The picture is not wholly bleak however, because total factor produc-
tivity studies, e.g. CEPA (2003b) are beginning to show that even crudely applied
e¢ ciency and productivity analysis together with incentive regulation can deliver
major gains in performance without endangering rm viability. In the governance
sector, e¢ ciency and productivity analysis has helped public service managers to
understand better the nature of public service output, so that in several countries
the public sector is slowly beginning to move away from using input usage as a
measure of performance.
Notes
1. I am grateful to Philip Burns and David Saal for commenting on this
paper. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
2. This will naturally have a UK bias partly because the UK has the one
of the longest experiences of both incentive regulation and benchmarking using
e¢ ciency and productivity analysis, and partly because of the authors own bias
in covering the literature.
3. The rst best outcome is characterised by an equilibrium level of average
cost at which the net social benet of investing to reduce average cost by $1 more
is just equal to the welfare loss of a $1 rise in price.
4. Schmalensee (1989) is the earliest model, but requires numerical solu-
tions as does Gasmi et al (1994), whereas Armstrong et al (1994) has an analytical
solution which aids comparative static analysis.
5. Armstrong et al (1994) xes the level of output at unity, and assumes a
zero elasticity of demand, at least for the range of price variability that is to be
modelled. This allows the model to be applied equally to price capping or revenue
capping situations.
6. In the sense that with sub-optimal incentive power, the range of values
of for which the contract will be rejected expands.
7. Note that each rm is assumed to have the same reservation level of
utility determined by the capital market.
8. The notation for the marginal utility of slack di¤ers from that used in
these papers to avoid confusion with the notation used by Arsmtrong et al (1994).
9. The analysis in this section uses results from Weyman-Jones et al (2006),
and Burns et al (2006)
10. The rst order conditions for utility maximisation reect the usual con-
dition relating marginal disutility of e¤ort to incentive power.
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11. Assuming the specication is correct, the maximum likelihood estima-
tor is consistent.
12. This ignores the issue that the minimum residual is endogenous to the
procedure for constructing the prediction interval.
9. Appendix
This appendix sets out the mathematical solutions of the two sub-games in
Armstrong et al (1994).
The Agents sub-game
Assume that disutility of e¤ort is expressed in monetary terms as:
 (e) =
e2
2
;  0 (e)  d (e)
de
= e
The rms prot is its allowed revenue minus cost, c =    e , and disutility:
 = P   (   e)  e
2
2
The unconstrained maximisation for the risk averse manager of the rm when
 is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is.
max
e
U = E ()  
2
var 
where
E () = P + (1  ) (  e)  (  e)  e
2
2
and
var  = 22
First and second order conditions are:
dU
de
=   (1  ) + 1 = 0; d
2U
de2
=  1 < 0
There is a unique global maximum where:
e =  0 (e) = 
To calculate the agent/rms level of utility in the optimising equilibrium,
substitute e =  into :
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U = E ()  
2
var
so that
U = P + (1  ) (  )  (  )  
2
2
  
2
22
or simply:
U = U
 
P ; ;; 2; 

The Principals Sub-game
Now substitute the optimal level of the agents e¤ort: e =  0 (e) =  wherever
the unobserved value of e¤ort is to be calculated, and minimise the expected value
of the price control, i.e. the rms regulated revenue:
min
P;
E (P ) = P + (1  )E (c) = P + (1  )E (   e) = P + (1  ) (  )
This is subject to the constraint that the equilibrium expected utility of the
agent/rm is at least as high as its reservation level of utility, U0 :
U = P    (  )  
2
2
 
1 + 2
  U0
Examination of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions rules out corner solutions, since
it is assumed that the regulator is interested in an incentive contract ( > 0),
unwilling to allow the rm surplus rent ( > 0), where  is the Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier, and that the rms reservation utility exceeds zero, requiring: P > 0.
Consequently the rst order conditions for the principals problem yield
P = U0 +  (  ) + 1
2

i.e.:
P

= P

(U0; ;) = P
  
U0;; 
2; 

and:
 =
1
(1 + 2)
i.e.:
 = 
 
2; 

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Yardstick competition model
Each rms problem is now:
max
e
U = P + (1  ) (i   ei)  k (  ej)  (   ei)
 e
2
i
2
  
2
 
22
 
1 + k2   2kr
dU
de
= (1  ) + 1  ei = 0 =) ei = 
Use this solution to nd the level of utility from participating in the game:
U = P    (1  k) (  )  
2
2
 
1 + 2
 
1 + k2   2kr
The regulators problem is:
min
P;;k
E (P ) = P + (1  ) (  ) + k (  )
s:t: U  U0
P  0;   0; k  0
Solve as before to obtain:
k = r
P = U0 +  (1  k) (  ) + 1
2

 =
1
(1 + 2 (1  r2))
The same caveats apply: sub-optimal choice of  leads to greater non-participation,
but increased e¤ort on the part of rms which do participate.
10. References
Agrell, Per and Peter Bogetoft, (2006) Model Specication, Bundesetzagentur
(2006) Incentive Regulation in the German Electricity and Gas Sector e¢ ciency
and reliability to set the yardstick, International Scientic Conference of the Bun-
desnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency), Bonn
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance 30
Agrell, Per, Peter Bogetoft and Jorgen Tind (2000) Multi-period DEA incentive
regulation in electricity Distribution, North American Productivity Workshop,
2000
Andersen, and Petersen (1993) A Procedure for Ranking E¢ cient Units in
Data Envelopment Analysis, Management Science, 39,1261-4
Armstrong, Mark, Simon Cowan and John Vickers (1994) Regulatory Reform:
Economic Analysis and British Experience, Boston, MIT Press, 1994
Atkinson, Tony (2005) Atkinson Review: Measurement of Government Output
and Productivity for the National Accounts, London, Palgrave
Banker, Rajiv D. (1993) Maximum Likelihood, Consistency and Data Envel-
opment Analysis, Management Science, 39, 10, October, 1265-1273
Bogetoft, Peter (1997) DEA-based Yardstick Competition: the optimality of
best practice regulation, Annals of Operations Research, 73, 277-98
Bös, D. (1991) Privatization: a theoretical treatment, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Bundesetzagentur (2006) Incentive Regulation in the German Electricity and
Gas Sector e¢ ciency and reliability to set the yardstick, International Scientic
Conference of the Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency), Bonn
Burns, Philip, Cloda Jenkins and Christoph Riechmann (2005) The role of
benchmarking for yardstick competition, Utilities Policy 13, 302-309
Burns, Philip, Cloda Jenkins and Thomas Weyman-Jones (2006) Information
Revelation and Incentives in Michael Crew and David Parker (eds) International
Handbook of Economic Regulation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
Carrington, Roger, Tim Coelli, and Eric Groom (2002) International Bench-
marking for Monopoly Price Regulation: the case of Australian Gas Distribution,
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 21, 2, March, 191-216
CEPA (2003a) Assessing e¢ ciency for the 2005 distribution price control re-
view, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates for Ofgem (UK O¢ ce of Gas and
Electricity Markets) London.
CEPA (2003b) Productivity Improvements in Distribution Network Operators,
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates for Ofgem (UK O¢ ce of Gas and Electric-
ity Markets) London.
Chambers, Robert G., (1988) Applied Production Analysis: a dual approach,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Coelli, Tim, Antonio Estache, Sergio Perelman, and Lourdes Trujillo (2003) A
Primer on E¢ ciency Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators, Wash-
ington, The World Bank, 2003
Crew, Michael and Paul R. Kleindorfer (2002) Regulatory Economics: Twenty
Years of Progress, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 21(1) 5-22
De Borger, B., K. Kerstens, W. Moesen, and J. Vanneste (1994), Explain-
ing di¤erences in productive e¢ ciency: an application to Belgian municipalities,
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance 31
Public Choice, 80, 339-58
Diewert, Erwin and Dennis Lawrence (2002) The Deadweight Costs of Capital
Taxation in Australia in Kevin J. Fox (ed) E¢ ciency in the Public Sector, Boston,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 104-167
Färe, Rolf, Shawna Grosskopf and C. A. Knox Lovell, (1994) Production Fron-
tiers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Filippini, Massimo, Medhi Farsi and Aurelio Fetz (2005) Benchmarking Analy-
sis in Electricity Distribution, Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, Swiss
Federal Institutes of Technology, CEPE Working Paper 39, March
Farrell, Joseph (1983) Monopoly Slack and Competitive Rigor: a simple ex-
ample, Massachusetts Institute of Technology mimeo, February 1983, reprinted in
Eric Rasmusen (ed) Readings in Games and Information, Oxford, Blackwells, 2001
Farrell, Michael (1957), The Measurement of Productive E¢ ciency, Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society A, CXX (Part 3) 253-90
Gagnepain, Philippe and Marc Ivaldi (2002) Stochastic Frontiers and Asym-
metric Information Models, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18, 145-159, 2002
Gasmi, F., M. Ivaldi, and J.J. La¤ont (1994) Rent Extraction and Incentives
for E¢ ciency in Recent Regulatory Proposals, Journal of Regulatory Economics,
6, 151-76
Greene, William G. (2003) Econometric Analysis, 5th edition, New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall
Greene, William G. (2005) Fixed and Random E¤ects in Stochastic Frontier
Models, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 23, 7-32
Hargreaves, John, Matt Parr, Helen Lay, and Melvyn Weeks (2006) Histori-
cal Review of Evidence and Ofwats Approach to E¢ ciency, Indepen Consulting
Limited, London
Hjalmarsson, L., S.C. Kumbhakar and A. Heshmati (1996) DEA, DFA, and
SFA: a comparison, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 7, 2/3, July, 303-28
Horrace, William C., and Peter Schmidt (1996) Condence Statements for E¢ -
ciency Estimates from stochastic frontier models, Journal of Productivity Analysis,
7, 2/3, July, 257-82
IPART (1999) Regulation of Electricity Network Service Providers, Incentives
and Principles for Regulation, Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of
New South Wales, http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.uk
Jamasb, Tooraj and Michael Pollitt (2003) International benchmarking and
regulation: an application to European electricity distribution utilities, Energy
Policy, 31, 1609-1622
Joskow, Paul (2005) Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity
Distribution and Transmission Networks, National Bureau of Economic Research
Conference on Economic Regulation, Washington
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance 32
La¤ont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Pro-
curement and Regulation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press
Land, K.C., C.A.K. Lovell, and Sten Thore (1993) Chance Constrained Data
Envelopment Analysis, Managerial and Decision Economics, 14, 541-554
Leibenstein, Harvey (1966) Allocative E¢ ciency vs. X-E¢ ciency, American
Economic Review, 56, 392-415
Lovell, C.A.K. (1993) Production Frontiers and Productive E¢ ciency in H.
Fried, C.A.K. Lovell and H. Schmidt (eds) The Measurement of Productive E¢ -
ciency, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Lovell, C.A. Knox (2002) Performance Assessment in the Public Sector, in
Kevin J Fox (ed) E¢ ciency in the Public Sector, Boston, Kluwer Acaemic Pub-
lishers
Orea, L. (2002) A Parametric Decomposition of a Generalised Malmquist Pro-
ductivity Index, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18, 1, 5-22
Petersen, N.C. (1990) Data Envelopment Analysis on a relaxed set of assump-
tions Management Science, 36, 305-14
Pollitt, Michael (2005) The role of e¢ ciency estimates in regulatory price re-
views: Ofgems approach to benchmarking electricity networks, Utilities Policy,
13, 279-88
Rasmusen, Eric (2001) Games and Information An Introduction to Game The-
ory, 3rd edition, Oxford, Blackwells, 2001
Ruggiero, John, (2004) Data Envelopment Analysis with stochastic data, Jour-
nal of the Operational Research Society, 55, 2004, 1008-1012
Saal, David, David Parker, and Thomas Weyman-Jones (2004) Determining
the contribution of technical, e¢ ciency and scale change to productivity growth in
the privatized English and Welsh water and sewerage industry: 1985-2000, Aston
Business School Working Paper RP0433 December 2004
Schmalensee, Richard (1989) Good regulatory regimes, RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 20, 3, Autumn, 417-36
Seaver, Bill L., and Konstantinos P. Triantis (1989), The Implications of Using
Messy Data to Estimate Production-Frontier-Based Technical E¢ ciency Measures,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 7, 1, 49-59
Shleifer, Andrei (1985) A Theory of Yardstick Competition, Rand Journal of
Economics, 16, 3, (Autumn) 319-327
Simar, Leopold (2003) Detecting Outliers in Frontier Models: a simple ap-
proach, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 20, 391-424
Simar, Leopold and Paul W. Wilson (2000) Statistical Inference in Nonpara-
metric Models: the state of the art, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13, 49-78
Vignoles, Anna, Rosalind Levacic, James Walker, Stephen Machin, and David
Reynolds (2000) The Relationship between Resource Allocation and Pupil Attain-
ment: a review, Value for Money Unit, London, UK Department of Education and
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis in Regulation and Governance 33
Skills
Viljainen, Satu, Kaisa Tahvanainen, Jukka Lassila, Samuli Honkapuro and
Jarmo Partanen (2004) Regulation of Electricity Distribution Business Nordic Dis-
tribution and Asset Management Conference
URL:<http://powersystems.tkk./nodac2004/
papers/nordac2004_honkapuro_et_alpaper.pdf>
Weyman-Jones, Thomas, Julia Boucinha, Celia Godhino, Catarina Feteira Ina-
cio, Pedro Martins, and Jon Latore (2006) E¢ ciency Analysis and Incentive Reg-
ulation in Tim Coelli and Denis Lawrence (eds) Performance Measurement and
Regulation of Network Industries, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
